Saturday, July 15, 2006

war in the middle east

Events of the past few days in Israel, Gaza and Lebanon have opened up a lot of uncertainty regarding the immediate future of the Middle East. Israel appears to be preparing for an invasion of Lebanon, presumably with the intention of cleaning out the terrorist of infrastucture of Hezbollah. Given the fact that Hezbollah is in some ways nothing more than a tool for Iran and Syria, any large scale attack on Hezbollah may draw in one or both of these nations: either by their choice (a retaliatiory strike against Israel), or by Israel's (a prememptive strike to allow Israel freedom of action in Lebanon). If Iran becomes involved in an open war with Israel, America and/or Israel may take advantage of the opportunity to strike Iran's nuclear infrastructure.

I can't predict how this will play out, but here are some guesses:

  • Moderate regimes in the region (Egypt, Saudi Arabi and Jordan) seem to be willing to let Israel take action against Hezbollah--when Saudi Arabia announces that Hezbollah is at fault for tensions in the region, it's the next best thing to granting the IDF permission to take the gloves off.
  • Israel can't significantly alter Hezbollah's position in Lebanon without committing ground troops. Hezbollah (and by extension, their puppet-masters in Damascus and Tehran) can win simply by surviving. Consequently, if Israel doesn't move beyond their current strategy of airstrikes and blockades against Lebanon alone, Syria and Iran will probably sit this one out. Why risk open war when the status quo results in victory?
  • Since Israel loses if they refuse to escalate their attacks on Hezbollah, Israel will commit ground troops.
  • Israel must be assured that Syria will not directly interfere with their operations in Lebanon. If Assad provides assurances that Syria will sit out this conflict, Israel will not launch preemptive strikes on Syria. If Syria refuses to provide these assurances of non-interference, expect to see the Syrian air force get demolished at about the same time Israel moves into Lebanon.
  • Syria isn't dumb enough to take on Israel without significant support from other regimes in the region. The only country that seems inclined to offer Syria concrete support is Iran, and they would have to pass through Turkey or Iraq to get forces into the battle. Since Syria will be facing Israel alone, I expect Syria to sit this fight out. On the other hand, it's possible Assad is too proud (or stupid?) to back down.
  • Iran is the country who is most likely to cause trouble. Iran's immediate goal is (I'm guessing) to destabilize Iraq, intending to ultimately bring the region closer to their vision of Islamist theocratic rule. The best method of destabilizing Iraq is probably to provoke some kind of Israeli or American attack against Iran, then to instigate "spontaneous" revolt by Iraqi Shiites against the Iraqi government.
  • Iran can't interfere with Israel directly, but missile strikes are possible. How Israel and the U.S. respond to such a provocation is probably dependent on how effective and persistent the Iranian provocation is.
  • If Iran can cause significant casualties in Israel then the whole region will become very messy.
  • Perhaps it would be more accurate to say "very much messier".

As I said, I can't predict anything. The above thoughts aren't worth more than the price of the paper they're printed on. Unless something like the above actually occurs, in which case you read it here first.

Chester's analysis was very helpful in shaping the thoughts above. And unlike me, he knows what he's talking about.

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