Iraq and the war on terror

CNN has already begun spinning the theme of Bush's speech tomorrow:

Bush has tried repeatedly to link Iraq to the anti-terror campaign launched after al Qaeda's September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington.

Though the 9/11 commission found no operational relationship between al Qaeda and Iraq before the 2003 invasion that toppled Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, critics say the insurgency against U.S. troops that followed Saddam's overthrow has drawn terrorists into Iraq to fight Americans.

Once again we find the popular press suggesting that the presence of terrorists in Iraq now is really just a response to Bush's aggression and that our invasion of Iraq served no real purpose in battling terror.

Critics of the war in Iraq ought to reconsider the strategic options we faced after 9/11 and try to understand how the invasion of Iraq fits into that menu of strategic choices. To illustrate the basic strategies we had available to us, let's consider the current operations that are ongoing inside of Iraq. The fight against the insurgency can be broken up into three distinct prongs:

1. Defensive Operations - The goal of defensive operations is simple--to protect our troops and the innocent populace from attack. Whether it's a roadblock checkpoint on a highway leading into Baghdad or a guard stationed on an oil terminal, our defensive operations seek to identify and defeat whatever attacks our enemies choose to launch. The problem with these defensive operations is twofold. First, we simply can not be strong everywhere. Secondly, defensive operations allow the enemy to choose the time and place of battle. Every defensive posture has a weakness that the enemy can exploit and our enemies are smart enough to attack our most vulnerable positions.


2. Offensive Operations - The goal of offensive operations is equally simple--to seek out and destroy the enemy on our terms. At the small end we are using intelligence from interrogations to identify and capture key terrorist leaders in targeted police raids. At the big end we are sending thousands of U.S. and Iraqi troops to systematically drive terrorists out of their strongholds such as Falluja. In either case, we seek to take the terrorists out of action before they can strike.


3. Social/Political Operations - We can effectively win both defensive and offensive battles for years to come, but these successes will be for naught if the country of Iraq never matures socially and politically. Consequently, the most important task we face is the building up of a government and a society that is committed to peace and cooperation, both internally and externally. The drafting of a new constitution, the completion of successful elections, the growth of a thriving economy and the prevention of racial or religious civil war are all key components of our social/political operations. If these are successful, the terrorists can never win. If these fail, we're in for a long and painful ride.

Similarly, in the global war on terror we had several strategic options available to us after 9/11:

1. Defensive Operations - Clearly, we had to take steps to shore up transportation security and immigration policy. But defensive action will always have the same flaws, allowing the enemy time to pick away at our weak points and avoid our strongest defenses. We took these steps, but they were not enough.


2. Offensive Operations - Again, we had to aggressively pursue Bin Laden and his organization and we did so by striking at his home base in Afghanistan. His organization suffered massive casualties as a result, but the terrain and the presence of a supportive Islamist populations in Afghanistan and Pakistan made it highly unlikely that we would ever be able to get them all (not to mention the probablility that Iran has offered shelter to much of al Qaeda's leadership).
   
3. Social/Political Operations - In the same way that we can't win the war in Iraq if we don't prompt significant changes in that country's societal institutions, I believe we will never win the war on terror if we can't force large-scale cultural changes throughout the Middle East. Prior to the invasion of Iraq, even our closest allies in the region were unelected monarchs who had to balance their pro-Western inclinations against the fear of populations that were culturally and religiously hostile to the West. With politicians, state run media and preachers all proclaiming the evils of the West (how else to explain the fact that little Israel could thrive economically in comparison to her Arab and Muslim neighbors?), terrorism seems to be a natural by-product of these broken societies. Only by altering that social landscape could we hope to eliminate the threat of terrorism in the long run.

So how does Iraq fit into the war on terror? By smashing Saddam's corrupt government and building a stable liberal democracy in the heart of the Middle East, we began a process that can change the entire social landscape of the region. Libya has given up WMD programs, Syria has backed out of Lebanon, Kuwaiti women are voting and nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia are at least giving lip service to the idea of allowing real elections in the future. The Middle East is changing in ways that we couldn't have dared to hope for immediately after 9/11. The invasion of Iraq isn't just part of the war on terror--it may well be the most critical part of that war.