Principles of Foreign Policy -- Part 5

I began this series of posts with a preview:

I believe we have real interests in the world that we have to defend. Defending those interests is only possible if we have a global military presence. We face real enemies in the world because our historical actions have placed us in conflicts with people that don't like us, but it's wishful thinking to assert that we could have avoided these conflicts in the past and it's foolhardy to pretend that we can avoid more such conflicts in the future. This is especially true because many of our worst enemies in the world are irrational operators whom we can't consistently influence without a credible threat of force.

I've already looked at America's interests, the need for a global military presence and the historical roots of our foreign policy problems. Let's take a look at the last statement: can we trust our enemies to respond to us rationally?

In 1967 Israel concluded that its Arab enemies (Egypt, Syria and Jordan) were incapable of winning a war, but that the Arabs were irrational enough to attack anyway. Israel launched a preemptive attack and won a decisive victory in the Six-day War [10]. In 1973 Israel concluded that its Arab enemies (Egypt and Syria) were incapable of winning a war, and that the Arabs were rational enough to refrain from attacking. Israel ignore several direct warnings and were nearly defeated by a surprise attack in the Yom Kippur War [11]. History is full of cases in which nations and leaders badly miscalculate and pay for their miscalculations. When we predict what the world would look like if America were to withdraw, we shouldn't make the mistake of assuming that leaders throughout the world will understand that it is in their best interest to behave nicely to their neighbors and to America. It's far more likely that some power-hungry regimes will see America's withdrawal as an opportunity. Overestimating their ability to expand their power and underestimating America's willingness to defend its interests in the world, bad actors throughout the world would become more hostile and assertive, not less.

The assumption of rationality is especially misplaced when applied to our terrorist enemies. Al Qaeda doesn't view the world through the lens of realism but through the lens of fantasy [12]. No matter how irrational their plans for establishing an Islamic caliphate or how futile their desire to wage jihad against the West, Islamist terrorists see themselves in engaged in acts of fantastic devotion to their God, and no diplomacy, disengagement or bribe can change their willingness to strike a symbolic blow against their enemies. We are better off forcing them to fight their battles in Iraq (the outcome of which will either be a tremendous symbolic victory for one side or the other, in Al Qaeda's twisted logic) than allowing them space to plot for a bigger, better 9/11.

[10] The Six-Day War
[11] The Yom Kippur War
[12] Al Qaeda's Fantasy Ideology

Principles of Foreign Policy -- Part 4

I began this series of posts with a preview:

I believe we have real interests in the world that we have to defend. Defending those interests is only possible if we have a global military presence. We face real enemies in the world because our historical actions have placed us in conflicts with people that don't like us, but it's wishful thinking to assert that we could have avoided these conflicts in the past and it's foolhardy to pretend that we can avoid more such conflicts in the future. This is especially true because many of our worst enemies in the world are irrational operators whom we can't consistently influence without a credible threat of force.

I've already looked at America's interests and the need for a global military presence. Let's take a look at the third statement: what role does our past foreign policy decisions play in our analysis of current foreign policy options?

When we examine the world of today and make decisions that will shape the world of the future, we have to understand that the world of today was shaped in the past by real people looking at real circumstances, making really important decisions based on really imperfect information. It's commonly argued that America has created many of the problems we face today by supporting people like Osama Bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, the Shah of Iran and others. It's an easy accusation to make, but it tends to fall apart when our past foreign policy decisions are analyzed in context. Let's take a very brief snapshot of our history for the last century.

We're in Iraq because of 9/11. Regardless what specifically motivated Bush to go to war (WMDs, oil, anti-terrorism, cultural imperialism, whatever), it's hard for me to imagine a world in which 9/11 didn't happen but we invaded Iraq anyway. Why did 9/11 happen? Al Qaeda has tried to justify 9/11 by claiming that it is a response to America's presence in Saudi Arabia, to our attacks against Iraq during and following the first Gulf War and to our support for Israel [6].

Why was America in Saudi Arabia? Because of the stand-off that resulted from the first Gulf War. Why did we fight the first Gulf War? Because Saddam very clearly threatened our national interests by conquering Kuwait and putting his powerful military in easy striking distance of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE [7]. We simply can't risk letting so much the world's oil supply fall under the control of a violent, capricious tyrant.

Why was Saddam powerful enough to attempt the invasion of Kuwait? In part because of U.S. military support during the '80s. Why did the U.S. support Saddam? In general, we supported him because we were in the middle of a cold war and we needed allies in a region that was (because of oil) critically important. More specifically, we supported Saddam because he was a counter-weight to the power of Iran, a country that attacked our embassy and held American diplomats hostage for more than a year.

Iranians attacked our embassy because they thought we were covertly manipulating their government and trying to undermine their Islamic revolution [8]. The Iranians badly misjudged our capabilities and our intentions, but it is true that we were a long-time ally of the Shah (whom they hated). Again, our support of the Shah was based on our strategic need for allies in the region in light of the Cold War that developed after WWII. It's possible to argue that America is at fault for the cold war, but only if you argue that we could have supported White Russian forces and defeated the Bolsheviks by military intervention after WWI [9].

Regarding American support for Israel, that too has an internal logic through history, from a Cold-war desire to support a democratic nation against attacks by soviet supported enemies, back to a decision to support the creation of a homeland for the Jews after the genocide of WWII, back to the historical reality that the land of "Palestine" was merely a province of the Ottoman empire up until British gained Mandate control after defeating the Ottomans in WWI.

Should we have fought Saddam in the first Gulf War? Should we have fought the cold war? Should we have fought WWII? What about WWI? How far back should we go in deciding that America had no right to intervene in the world to protect her own interests? Should we have just decided to let the Brits keep their colonies so that nobody in the world would be offended by our actions?

Our past policies have always been based to some degree on a need to protect American interests throughout the world. Some of those decisions have been flawed but that is unavoidable: we have always had imperfect leaders, they have always been beholden to an imperfect constituency, and no American has ever been blessed with perfect information about present circumstances or the future consequences of various policy options. We are where we are because our past leaders have tried to do what's best for America, and it's impossible to say how much worse our history might look if America had chosen not to intervene in the world.

It's easy to identify various bad apples that have in some ways been supported by America in the past and turned against us, but at the same time we should recognize the positive results of our interference in foreign affairs (a prosperous Western Europe, prosperous Japan and South Korea, a victory in the Cold War, and stable world trade that promotes prosperity in America). Only by ignoring the truth about what happened in the past can you claim that all of our past interventions in the world were unnecessary and counterproductive.

[6] Al Qaeda's Fatwa
[7] John Kifner, New York Times, August 6, 1990
[8] The Fallacy of Power
[9] Toward an Entangling Alliance

Principles of Foreign Policy -- Part 3

I began this series of posts with a preview:

I believe we have real interests in the world that we have to defend. Defending those interests is only possible if we have a global military presence. We face real enemies in the world because our historical actions have placed us in conflicts with people that don't like us, but it's wishful thinking to assert that we could have avoided these conflicts in the past and it's foolhardy to pretend that we can avoid more such conflicts in the future. This is especially true because many of our worst enemies in the world are irrational operators whom we can't consistently influence without a credible threat of force.

I've already looked at America's interests. Let's take a look at the second statement: why do we need a global military presence?

The world is a big place, so logistics matters. When our interests span the globe we have to be able to effectively protect those interests around the world. Our air and naval forces are unmatched in the world, but neither force can be of much use if we don't have a logistical support structure built up that spans the globe. A fleet needs ports and an air force needs air bases. Ports and air bases are only available through the cooperation of allies.

Neither a navy nor an air force is sufficient to truly protect our interests throughout the world because neither force can put boots on the ground. Bombs, torpedoes and cruise missiles can cripple an enemy's economy by wrecking infrastructure and halting trade, but a regime that is willing to let its people suffer is a regime that can ignore our navy and air force if we don't have the capacity to put boots on the ground. While a few marine expeditionary units can be maintained on ships, MEUs simply do not have the firepower or logistical infrastructure necessary to fight and win a long war against a well equipped, large army [4].

If we want to be capable of winning wars like the first Gulf War, we have to be capable of quickly putting a modern army in the field. This is only possible if military equipment is prepositioned around the world. Prepositioning of military equipment again requires allies and basing agreements. If we want to have any chance of effectively intervening around the globe, we must have a logistical footprint of basing and cooperative allies around the globe to support our efforts [5].

[4] Rethinking Army-Marine Corps Roles in Power Projection
[5] The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy

Principles of Foreign Policy -- Part 2

I began this series of posts with a preview:

I believe we have real interests in the world that we have to defend. Defending those interests is only possible if we have a global military presence. We face real enemies in the world because our historical actions have placed us in conflicts with people that don't like us, but it's wishful thinking to assert that we could have avoided these conflicts in the past and it's foolhardy to pretend that we can avoid more such conflicts in the future. This is especially true because many of our worst enemies in the world are irrational operators whom we can't consistently influence without a credible threat of force.

Let's take a look at that first statement: what interests does America have that are worth defending with an interventionist foreign policy?

Commerce: we trade with virtually everybody which means Americans and American properties are everywhere, our economy relies on natural resources such as oil, and our prosperity is based in part on a global trade network that is only possible when stability throughout the world allows sea lanes to stay open and global trade to flow freely [1].

Power: All other things being equal, when America faces threats we are better able to deal with those threats if we have more power. Not every opportunity to gain power is worth the price, but sometimes it is absolutely true that we are better off paying a price to gain or maintain power. Additionally, power is only useful if there is a credible possibility that the power will be used. If we are forever demonstrating an absolute unwillingness to use our power, our enemies will learn that it is safe to ignore our power and attack our interests [2].

Honor: we are better off in a world in which we have many friends that want to cooperate with us and few enemies that want to harm us. This means that we have to preserve a reputation for being a good friend as well as a reputation for being a dangerous enemy. If we renege on promises to friends or we
demonstrate a willingness to back down in the face of provocation, we will find ourselves with fewer friends and more enemies [3].

[1] The Pentagon's New Map
[2] While America Sleeps
[3] On the Origins of War

Principles of Foreign Policy -- Part 1

For the last few weeks I've been engaged in a long running email debate with a friend of a friend about the merits of Ron Paul. Yeah, imagine that. Ron Paul is my white whale. Anyway, lately we've been discussing the role of the military in America's foreign policy. The basic issue seems simple enough: should America's military be spread out around the world intervening in the affairs of other nations, or should the military be primarily located within our borders and primarily tasked with protecting our borders?

As I was writing my latest email I realized that there are a lot of unspoken assumptions underlying any proposed strategy for utilizing our military in support of our foreign policy objectives. So I took a step back and laid out the basic assumptions I make when I talk about these issues. Rather than transcribe the entire email in a single post, I'll break it up and look at in a few chunks that are a bit easier to manage. Here's a preview:

I believe we have real interests in the world that we have to defend. Defending those interests is only possible if we have a global military presence. We face real enemies in the world because our historical actions have placed us in conflicts with people that don't like us, but it's wishful thinking to assert that we could have avoided these conflicts in the past and it's foolhardy to pretend that we can avoid more such conflicts in the future. This is especially true because many of our worst enemies in the world are irrational operators whom we can't consistently influence without a credible threat of force.