Principles of Foreign Policy -- Part 3

I began this series of posts with a preview:

I believe we have real interests in the world that we have to defend. Defending those interests is only possible if we have a global military presence. We face real enemies in the world because our historical actions have placed us in conflicts with people that don't like us, but it's wishful thinking to assert that we could have avoided these conflicts in the past and it's foolhardy to pretend that we can avoid more such conflicts in the future. This is especially true because many of our worst enemies in the world are irrational operators whom we can't consistently influence without a credible threat of force.

I've already looked at America's interests. Let's take a look at the second statement: why do we need a global military presence?

The world is a big place, so logistics matters. When our interests span the globe we have to be able to effectively protect those interests around the world. Our air and naval forces are unmatched in the world, but neither force can be of much use if we don't have a logistical support structure built up that spans the globe. A fleet needs ports and an air force needs air bases. Ports and air bases are only available through the cooperation of allies.

Neither a navy nor an air force is sufficient to truly protect our interests throughout the world because neither force can put boots on the ground. Bombs, torpedoes and cruise missiles can cripple an enemy's economy by wrecking infrastructure and halting trade, but a regime that is willing to let its people suffer is a regime that can ignore our navy and air force if we don't have the capacity to put boots on the ground. While a few marine expeditionary units can be maintained on ships, MEUs simply do not have the firepower or logistical infrastructure necessary to fight and win a long war against a well equipped, large army [4].

If we want to be capable of winning wars like the first Gulf War, we have to be capable of quickly putting a modern army in the field. This is only possible if military equipment is prepositioned around the world. Prepositioning of military equipment again requires allies and basing agreements. If we want to have any chance of effectively intervening around the globe, we must have a logistical footprint of basing and cooperative allies around the globe to support our efforts [5].

[4] Rethinking Army-Marine Corps Roles in Power Projection
[5] The U.S. Army and the New National Security Strategy