Principles of Foreign Policy -- Part 5

I began this series of posts with a preview:

I believe we have real interests in the world that we have to defend. Defending those interests is only possible if we have a global military presence. We face real enemies in the world because our historical actions have placed us in conflicts with people that don't like us, but it's wishful thinking to assert that we could have avoided these conflicts in the past and it's foolhardy to pretend that we can avoid more such conflicts in the future. This is especially true because many of our worst enemies in the world are irrational operators whom we can't consistently influence without a credible threat of force.

I've already looked at America's interests, the need for a global military presence and the historical roots of our foreign policy problems. Let's take a look at the last statement: can we trust our enemies to respond to us rationally?

In 1967 Israel concluded that its Arab enemies (Egypt, Syria and Jordan) were incapable of winning a war, but that the Arabs were irrational enough to attack anyway. Israel launched a preemptive attack and won a decisive victory in the Six-day War [10]. In 1973 Israel concluded that its Arab enemies (Egypt and Syria) were incapable of winning a war, and that the Arabs were rational enough to refrain from attacking. Israel ignore several direct warnings and were nearly defeated by a surprise attack in the Yom Kippur War [11]. History is full of cases in which nations and leaders badly miscalculate and pay for their miscalculations. When we predict what the world would look like if America were to withdraw, we shouldn't make the mistake of assuming that leaders throughout the world will understand that it is in their best interest to behave nicely to their neighbors and to America. It's far more likely that some power-hungry regimes will see America's withdrawal as an opportunity. Overestimating their ability to expand their power and underestimating America's willingness to defend its interests in the world, bad actors throughout the world would become more hostile and assertive, not less.

The assumption of rationality is especially misplaced when applied to our terrorist enemies. Al Qaeda doesn't view the world through the lens of realism but through the lens of fantasy [12]. No matter how irrational their plans for establishing an Islamic caliphate or how futile their desire to wage jihad against the West, Islamist terrorists see themselves in engaged in acts of fantastic devotion to their God, and no diplomacy, disengagement or bribe can change their willingness to strike a symbolic blow against their enemies. We are better off forcing them to fight their battles in Iraq (the outcome of which will either be a tremendous symbolic victory for one side or the other, in Al Qaeda's twisted logic) than allowing them space to plot for a bigger, better 9/11.

[10] The Six-Day War
[11] The Yom Kippur War
[12] Al Qaeda's Fantasy Ideology